IMDEA Networks Institute Publications Repository

A Model to Quantify the Success of a Sybil Attack Targeting RELOAD/Chord Resources

Urueña, Manuel and Cuevas, Rubén and Cuevas, Ángel and Banchs, Albert (2013) A Model to Quantify the Success of a Sybil Attack Targeting RELOAD/Chord Resources. [Journal Articles]

[img]
Preview
PDF (A Model to Quantify the Success of a Sybil Attack Targeting RELOAD/Chord Resources) - Published Version
Download (147Kb) | Preview

Abstract

The Sybil attack is one of the most harmful security threats for distributed hash tables (DHTs). This attack is not only a theoretical one, but it has been spotted "in the wild", and even performed by researchers themselves to demonstrate its feasibility. In this letter we analyse the Sybil attack whose objective is that the targeted resource cannot be accessed by any user of a Chord DHT, by replacing all the replica nodes that store it with sybils. In particular, we propose a simple, yet complete model that provides the number of random node-IDs that an attacker would need to generate in order to succeed with certain probability. Therefore, our model enables to quantify the cost of performing a Sybil resource attack on RELOAD/Chord DHTs more accurately than previous works, and thus establishes the basis to measure the effectiveness of different solutions proposed in the literature to prevent or mitigate Sybil attacks.

Item Type: Journal Articles
Uncontrolled Keywords: Chord,Distributed Hash Table(DHT),Kademlia,P2PSIP,REsource LOcation And Discovery(RELOAD),Sybil resource attack.
Subjects: UNSPECIFIED
Divisions: UNSPECIFIED
Depositing User: Rebeca De Miguel
Date Deposited: 22 Nov 2013 16:34
Last Modified: 22 Nov 2013 16:57
URI: http://eprints.networks.imdea.org/id/eprint/646

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item