Lutu, Andra and Bagnulo, Marcelo (2011) The Tragedy of the Internet Routing Commons. In: IEEE International Conference on Communications ICC 2011 - Communication QoS Reliability and Modeling Symposium (IEEE ICC CQRM 2011), 4-9 June, 2011, Kyoto, Japan.
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Over the last years, the research community has been deeply concerned about the scalability issues that the Internet routing is facing. In this paper we study the economic incentives for the Global Routing Table (GRT) explosive growth by considering a commons model in which the GRT is a public resource. In particular, we analyze the motivations the Autonomous Systems (ASes) have for deaggregating their assigned address blocks. We evaluate the efﬁciency of the global routing system, the properties of the game equilibria and we examine its relation to the optimal social welfare point of the considered game setup. We prove that the GRT, just like any common natural resource, “remorselessly generates tragedy”, following Hardin’s game theoretic analysis on the tragedy of the commons. Finally, we introduce in the model a payment mechanism that aims to avoid the tragedy of the Internet routing commons.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Papers (Paper)|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Network Modeling, BGP, Game Theory, Trafﬁc Economics, Trafﬁc Engineering|
|Subjects:||Q Science > Q Science (General)
Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
T Technology > T Technology (General)
T Technology > TA Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General)
T Technology > TK Electrical engineering. Electronics Nuclear engineering
|Divisions:||Faculty of Engineering, Science and Mathematics > School of Electronics and Computer Science|
|Depositing User:||Acosta Angel|
|Date Deposited:||08 Mar 2012 09:34|
|Last Modified:||15 Dec 2016 12:02|
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