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Algorithmic Mechanisms for Reliable Crowdsourcing Computation under Collusion

Fernández Anta, Antonio and Georgiou, Chryssis and Mosteiro, Miguel A. and Pareja, Daniel (2015) Algorithmic Mechanisms for Reliable Crowdsourcing Computation under Collusion. [Journal Articles]

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Abstract

We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns a task for execution to worker processors that may collude. We model the workers’ decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the computation cost) as a game among workers. That is, we assume that workers are rational in a game-theoretic sense. We identify analytically the parameter conditions for a unique Nash Equilibrium where the master obtains the correct result. We also evaluate experimentally mixed equilibria aiming to attain better reliability-profit trade-offs. For a wide range of parameter values that may be used in practice, our simulations show that, in fact, both master and workers are better off using a pure equilibrium where no worker cheats, even under collusion, and even for collud- ing behaviors that involve deviating from the game.

Item Type: Journal Articles
Subjects: UNSPECIFIED
Divisions: UNSPECIFIED
Depositing User: Antonio Fernandez
Date Deposited: 26 Mar 2015 14:00
Last Modified: 30 Nov 2016 11:58
URI: http://eprints.networks.imdea.org/id/eprint/1032

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